We do not have a completely releasable table of contents yet because we add to it about every other day new briefs that need written. But we at least know our affs (and their negs). You will like them because they have plan advocates from which we derived the mandates (we don’t just make it up, as you shouldn’t let people get away with).

1. Foreign Aid Redirection

2. Indus Water Treaty Reinvigoration

3. H1B Caps Lifted

4. Actionless Advantage: Supporting India into UNSC

5. Coca-Cola Water Regulation/Compensation

6. Anti-Piracy Naval Intelligence Sharing

7. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Iran

8.  U.S. Intervention in Kashmir Crisis

9. End Preemption Doctrine

10. No more Robin Hood: Intellectual Property Rights

11.  No Nukes! No Nukes! No Deal!

12. “No Sweat” Labelling

Sample Case:

1AC 1.1 – Naval Cooperation

 

In a 2005 Transportation Law Journal article, J.D. Candidate Phil DeCaro wrote,

 

“Of vital importance to the stability and maintenance of the security of strategic sea lanes is the protection and safety of such waterways as the Straits of Malacca. Piracy is one of the most grave problems persisting in East Asia. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 there has been considerable interest in the acts of pirates and to classify them as terrorists. “Experts, however, fail to realize that the popular perception that the international community has eliminated sea piracy is far from true. Not only has piracy never been eradicated, but the number of pirate attacks on ships has also tripled in the past decade-putting piracy at its highest level in modern history.” More than two-thirds of piratical attacks worldwide occur in Asian waters. In 2000, the region accounted for 65% of piracy worldwide. In 2003, 42% of pirate attacks took place in the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia.”

 

Because today’s sophisticated pirates, with GPS, radar, and deadly force, threaten the world’s sea lanes, my partner and I are confidently…Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should significantly change its policy toward India. We will first analyze the resolution, then demonstrate the threat, and finally offer a plan that reduces the threat to sea lanes.

 

Observation I: Resolutional Analysis

 

A. Definitions

 

1. Significantly “in an important way or to an important degree,” from Princeton’s WordNet, which also defines

 

2. Policy as “a plan of action.”

 

All other definitions are clarified by their use. To help you make the best decision about whether this resolution is true or not, we offer you

 

B. Policy Weighing Mechanism

 

In order to determine whether to change or not, it is recommended that you evaluate policy through the lense of policy goals and determine whether the status quo or our plan will better achieve those goals.

 

1. Goal…Maritime Security. The first sentence of the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security states: “The safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s oceans.” Maritime security, therefore, is essential to not only the U.S., but to world trade flows.

 

2. Criteria: Anti-piracy. If we can increase anti-piracy efforts, then we will have enhanced maritime security.

 

If, absent some better goal presented by the negative team, we demonstrate an increase in maritime security at the end of this round, you should vote affirmative.

 

Observation II: The Threat to Maritime Security

 

A. Status Quo:

1) Piracy is Alive and Well. As my opening quote stated, piracy is at its highest levels in modern history. This is enough to be concerned, but let’s take a closer look at piracy’s geography.

 

2) The Region near India is most affected. Most piracy occurs off the coast of Africa and in South Asian waters, such as the critical Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Straits, and Indian Ocean. Of world piracy, in fact, 98% of it occurs in the Southern Hemisphere.

Niclas Dahlvang [J.D., cum laude, B.A., cum laude, History] “THIEVES, ROBBERS, & TERRORISTS: PIRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY” Regent Journal of International Law, 2006 (4 Regent J. Int’l L. 17)

“It should also be noted that South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America accounted for 318 out of 325 pirate attacks (or ninety-eight percent) reported in 2004. Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, maritime piracy remains a significant threat. In addition to the hazard of piracy along the world’s major shipping routes, the relationship between piracy and terrorism presents a threat to all coastal nations. Action must be taken to fight piracy and stop its use as a tool and weapon of terrorists.”

 

Mr. Dahlvang made our third status quo point for us, which is…

 

3) Piracy is becoming linked to ideology.

Dr. Leticia Diaz, [Professor of Law; J.D., Rutgers University; Ph.D. (Organic Chemistry), Rutgers] AND Dr. Barry Hart Dubner, [Professor of Law; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of Law; LL.M., New York University School of Law; J.S.D., New York University School of Law.] “ON THE PROBLEM OF UTILIZING UNILATERAL ACTION TO PREVENT ACTS OF SEA PIRACY AND TERRORISM: A PROACTIVE APPROACH TO THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Fall, 2004, (32 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 1)

            “The ICC Commercial Crime Services reported that on September 2, 2003, gangs of heavily armed pirates used fishing and speed boats to target small oil tankers in the Malacca Strait. These attacks followed a pattern which had been set by Indonesian Aceh rebels. This was the first time that the IMB had discussed “political piracy.” The problem with the escalation in “political” piracy (politically motivated terrorists and pirates) is that they will take greater risks in order to further their cause. The greater risk could lead to untold environmental damage. On October 31, 2003, the IMB again warned of a strong possibility of political attacks on gas tankers and chemical tankers by pirates/terrorists that could lead to major environmental disaster. The numbers of acts of piracy throughout the world had “reached a record 344 in the first nine months of 2003, with Indonesian waters remaining the most dangerous.””

 

 

 

 

B. Impacts:

1) Major Costs to World Shipping and Tourism

Michael Bahar [Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy, J.D. from Harvard, Staff Judge Advocate for the NASSAU Strike Group between April 2005 and June 2006. M.Phil in International Relations from Cambridge University, B.A. in Political Science from Yale University. Professor of international relations] “Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, January, 2007 (40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1)

            “While crews are beaten, sometimes killed, and often held hostage for long periods of time for ransom, the global economic consequences are similarly dire and extend far beyond the small dhows and cargo ships actually attacked. The IMB estimates that piracy costs transport vessels $ 13-15 billion a year in losses in the waters between the Pacific and Indian oceans alone. Small cargo dhows, for example, are extending their routes to remain at least 200 miles off Somalia‘s east coast per IMB’s guidance. They have complained that the excess fuel and opportunity costs associated with “the long route” are crippling, tempting some to cut corners, gambling against the house with their lives. While the chilling effect on international trade is substantial, pirates have also begun to directly target tourists. In November 2005, passengers on the cruise ship Seabourne Spirit described the horrors as Somali pirates in speedboats attacked them with AK-47 bursts and shouldered RPG launchers.”

 

2) Threatens entire world’s economy

Again, from Michael Bahar…

“Worse is the potential for piratical terrorism. As one commentator has warned, “just as terrorists learned to be pilots for 9/11, terrorists may now be learning to be pirates.” Citing the example of the March 2003 hijacking of the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in which the Indonesian-speaking attackers “seemed primarily interested in practicing to steer the ship down the congested waterway,” Burnett has noted that intentionally grounding a crude carrier hauling 2 million barrels of oil at a place like Batu Berhanti, where the Straits of Malacca are a mere 1.5 miles wide, would close the waterway indefinitely. The resultant “delay in oil supplies to China, Japan, and South Korea could devastate their economies, setting off a global economic crisis.“”

 

Thus, through these two impacts, it can be seen that piracy poses both a huge current cost, and massive potential danger if the link to terrorism is successfully and catastrophically made. To provide a more secure maritime environment, we present…

 

Observation III. The Plan:

Agency and Enforcement – The Executive Branch and Department of Defense

Mandates:

1) Invite India‘s navy to a joint blue-water partnership with the US Navy and US Coast Guard. This partnership will involve sharing U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence regarding the Indian Ocean and Straits of Malacca, shift exchanges and coordination between the U.S. and Indian Navy, and mutual protection from threats.

2) The U.S. shall invite India to join Task Force 150, the U.S.-led coalition for maritime security.

3) The U.S. will fund India’s Navy and Coast Guard with $2bn to support anti-piracy training, missions, and purchase better equipment.

Funding: Normal Appropriations by Congress in 2009 budget

 

Observation IV. Maritime Security Enhanced

 

1) India-U.S. Cooperation Reduces Piracy Threats

Dr. James R. Holmes [former surface warfare officer and an associate professor of strategy at the Naval War College.] and Dr. Andrew C. Winner [associate professor of strategic studies at the Naval War College ] “A NEW NAVAL DIPLOMACY.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July, 2007 (0041798X, Jul2007, Vol. 133, Issue 7)

            “Second, they [the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard] should play up the economic benefits of maritime counterproliferation. Delousing the Indian Ocean shipping lanes of weapons-related goods will further India‘s economic and security interests as Indian leaders construe these interests. Governments would likely shut down the supply chain — including its crucial maritime link — if terrorists ever managed to use the sea lanes to carry out a catastrophic attack. As joint custodians of maritime security in the Indian Ocean basin, India and the United States can reduce the likelihood of an event that would have repercussions throughout the globalized world. The PSI pays economic dividends.”

 

Thus, Jointly guarding maritime security in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. and India can reduce the threat of an economically devastating event.

 

2) Taking up India’s offer is a Force Multiplier

Karl F. Inderfurth [M.A. from Princeton, Former assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, former ambassador to the UN, former Deputy U.S. Rep. on the UN Security Council, former staff for the National Security Council, International Affairs Professor], and Bruce Riedel [India expert at Brookings Institution, former CIA officer, senior advisor to 3 U.S. Presidents on South Asian issues, M.A. from Harvard in Diplomatic History], “Breaking More Naan with Delhi: The Next Stage in U.S.-India Relations,” National Interest, Nov/Dec 2007 (Issue 92, 08849382)

“Part of a PC Plus agenda involves strengthening India-U.S. military cooperation. Now it is time to build further on this relationship. Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the chief of the Indian Naval Staff, has said he wants a blue-water Indian Navy that seeks “mutually respectful partnerships that ensure the stability of the Indian Ocean.” The United States should take up this offer and expand our already significant naval exercises and planning, sharing more information on deployments and rotating responsibility for patrol duties in sensitive sea lanes. Alternating shifts would avoid any hint of spheres of influence and ensure greater capability to cooperate in times of crisis in the same patrol zones. Given finite resources in both navies, this would create a force multiplier for stability.”

 

3) India’s Navy should be Strengthened

Dr. Stephen P. Cohen [Professor of Political Science and History, Ph.D., India and South Asia expert at Brookings, former Policy Planning Staff member at State Dept.], “More than Just the 123 Agreement: The Future of U.S.-India Relations,” Testimony to House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South Asia, June 25, 2008, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/coh062508.pdf

“There will be many opportunities for second-tier cooperation, notably in disaster relief, anti piracy efforts, and in helping stabilize countries that are unable to maintain their own integrity. Naval cooperation is likely to be the most fruitful area, as the Indian navy performs at a very high level of professionalism, and now has a doctrine that encourages such cooperation. India should be invited to join the Task Force 150 in the Gulf, and India’s navy and its capacity for power projection should be strengthened.”

 

We believe that we have provided a policy to better act upon the recommendations of the National Strategy for Maritime Security, which says:

“The safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world’s oceans. The United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. We must be prepared to stop terrorists and rogue states before they can threaten or use weapons of mass destruction or engage in other attacks against the United States and our allies and friends. Toward that end, the United States must take full advantage of strengthened alliances and other international cooperative arrangements, innovations in the use of law enforcement personnel and military forces, advances in technology, and strengthened intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.”

 

(Three second pause while you stare everyone down confidently… I am open for Cross-Examination)

 

 

Strategy Notes: The most crucial point in this case is the solvency. While much of the backup evidence helps to answer questions such as UN Law of the Sea, will India cooperate with us, etc, do not underestimate the power of the intelligence sharing mandate. While you can answer all those solvency objections with relative ease, if they bring up no disadvantages (and therefore have no offense against your case), then you need to emphasize that your intelligence sharing mandate alone is enough to make it worth the plan. With U.S. over-the-horizon radar and its AWACS planes patrolling, plus the funnel of info it gets in the Indian Ocean from Task Force 150, even simply sending intelligence to the Indian navy will allow them to have impact in waters where the U.S. cannot patrol.

We additionally included a sum of money to help India’s navy modernize to act as yet another advantage that can be used when there are significant solvency points but little standing DAs by the 2AR. The real strength of this case is the lack of unique disadvantages with impact. If anyone actually does take up a position against fighting piracy, in most cases we are already doing exactly the activity the disadvantage describes and we even already operate in this ocean.

Be really happy if anyone runs inherency because it will contradict 90% of the possible DAs and solvency points against this case and it is relatively easy to prove that you are doing somewhat more than the Status Quo even if new developments this year show that we do actually increase some naval cooperation.

Significance is easy but beware of relying solely on the Malacca Strait, since that is technically Indonesian/Malaysian territory (though it is an international commerce byway). Solvency may cut you out of some advantages there, but so far in 2008 the sea near India has been at higher risk than Indonesia or Malaysia and you can go pretty much to the coast of Africa to fight piracy—you’re still talking a LOT of pirates.

Your significance points are easy: emphasize the economic and security consequences. Proving the link from piracy to ideology (terrorism) is not entirely crucial but it sure supercharges the significance. I especially like the piracy costs $13-15 billion a year card b/c it quantifies.

Lastly, on the UN law of the sea and definitions of piracy. Don’t let people trip you up to say it’s against the law somehow to conduct anti-piracy operations in littoral waters just because a bad UN definition defines piracy as on the “open seas.” No UN legal mandate is being invoked here and that would be a ridiculous standard b/c it would mean within 2 miles of any coast (public beaches perhaps) as long as pirates were still in the water every country could do nothing about them. Think of the implications of such solvency arguments and show why most of the world ignores the UN Law of the Sea.