This is an outline for cases like manganese drilling, uranium deposits, and anything else that you’ve never heard of until the 1A opened their mouth.

A) Examples of past “crises” (acid rain, end of the world, ice age, etc… weird resources)

B) Publication bias. Only 1 out of 20 journal articles gets published. Journals select the most INTERESTING ones not the boring normal ones that confirm what we know.

C) Impact: Don’t make national policy on little goobery things. Don’t feed the beast. The academic crisis.

D) Trust free market economics.

1) – Hasn’t let us down much

2) – Businesses are free to try and find this stuff (BOP rests of AFF to show that is not the case)

3) – Govt shouldn’t control it anyways, so double bind: Either economics refute their case b/c supply and demand have demonstrated it false, OR their case goes too far b/c it has Govt control instead of simply deregulating so that businesses who have supply/demand incentives can act. So NEG stance is: in no case let Govt drill/own/control, and let free market economics ALWAYS apply.

Free Market Economics SOLVENCY: Elephants in Zimbabwe vs. Kenya

Elephants SolvencyAssigning a Price Tag Saved Elephants in Zimbabwe, but Environmental Protection Didn’t in Kenya

Dr. Terry Anderson (PhD. in Economics; Senior Fellow and Cochair, Property Rights, Freedom, and Prosperity Task Force) and Shawn Regan, “Shoot an Elephant, Save a Community,” Defining Ideas (a Hoover Institution Journal), June 6, 2011, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/81076

By assigning economic value to animals, hunting preserves more wildlife than it kills. After Kenya banned all hunting in 1977, its population of large wild animals declined between 60 and 70 percent. For the landowners who bear the costs of wildlife, the decision of whether to protect wildlife is a simple one: if it pays, it stays. The ban on hunting gives wildlife little or no economic value, causing rural Africans to view wildlife as a liability to be avoided rather than an asset to be protected. As a result, landowners have increasingly turned to agriculture instead of habitat protection, which decreases available habitat and increases the potential for human-wildlife conflicts.”
Kenya’s Only Increase Happens on Limited Territory

Dr. Terry Anderson (PhD. in Economics; Senior Fellow and Cochair, Property Rights, Freedom, and Prosperity Task Force) and Shawn Regan, “Shoot an Elephant, Save a Community,” Defining Ideas (a Hoover Institution Journal), June 6, 2011, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/81076

“Anti-hunting groups succeeded in getting Kenya to ban all hunting in 1977. Since then, its population of large wild animals has declined between 60 and 70 percent. The country’s elephant population declined from 167,000 in 1973 to just 16,000 in 1989. Poaching took its toll on elephants because of their damage to both cropland and people. Today Kenya wildlife officials boast a doubling of the country’s elephant population to 32,000, but nearly all are in protected national parks where poaching can be controlled. With only 8 percent of its land set aside as protected areas, it is no wonder that wildlife in general and elephants in particular have trouble finding hospitable habitat.”

 

Zimbabwe’s Ownership Program Succeeded, with Hunting

Dr. Terry Anderson (PhD. in Economics; Senior Fellow and Cochair, Property Rights, Freedom, and Prosperity Task Force) and Shawn Regan, “Shoot an Elephant, Save a Community,” Defining Ideas (a Hoover Institution Journal), June 6, 2011, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/81076

In sharp contrast to Kenya, consider what has happened in Zimbabwe. In 1989, results-oriented groups such as the World Wildlife Fund helped implement a program known as the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources or CAMPFIRE. This approach devolves the rights to benefit from, dispose of, and manage natural resources to the local level, including the right to allow safari hunting. Community leaders with local knowledge about wildlife and its interface with humans help establish sustainable hunting quotas. Hunting then provides jobs for community members, compensation for crop and property damage, revenue to build schools, clinics, and water wells, and meat for villagers—just as Parsons’ elephant did. The numbers attest to the program’s success. Ten years after the program began, wildlife populations had increased by 50 percent. By 2003, elephant numbers had doubled from 4,000 to 8,000. The gains have not just been for wildlife, however. Between 1989 and 2001, CAMPFIRE generated more than $20 million in direct income, the vast majority of which came from hunting. During that period, the program benefitted an estimated 90,000 households and had a total economic impact of $100 million. In other words, wildlife in Africa needs economic value to survive.

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